In this paper, we construct a new scheme for delegating a large circuit family, which we call "C+P circuits". "C+P" circuits are the circuits composed of Toffoli gates and diagonal gates. Our scheme is non-interactive, only requires small quantum resources on the client side, and can be proved secure in the quantum random oracle model, without relying on additional assumptions, for example, the existence of fully homomorphic encryption. In practice the random oracle can be replaced by appropriate hash functions or symmetric key encryption schemes, for example, SHA-3, AES. This protocol allows a client to delegate the most expensive part of some quantum algorithms, for example, Shor's algorithm. The previous protocols that are powerful enough to delegate Shor's algorithm require either many rounds of interactions or the existence of FHE. The quantum resources required by the client are fewer than when it runs Shor's algorithm locally. Different from many previous protocols, our scheme is not based on quantum one time pad, but on a new encoding called "entanglement encoding". We then generalize the garbled circuit to reversible garbled circuit to allow the computation on this encoding. To prove the security of this protocol, we study key dependent message(KDM) security in the quantum random oracle model. Then as a natural generalization, we define and study quantum KDM security. KDM security was not previously studied in quantum settings.
Introduction
In computation delegation, there is a client holding secret data ϕ and the description of circuit C that it wants to apply, but it doesn't have the ability to compute C(ϕ) himself. A delegation protocol allows the client to compute C(ϕ) with the help from a more computationally powerful server. The delegation is private if the server cannot learn anything about the input ϕ during the protocol. After some communications, the client can decrypt the response from the server and get the computation result(see Figure 1 .) This problem is important ⋆ Supported in part by NSF awards IIS-1447700 and AF-1763786 in the quantum setting: it's likely that quantum computers, when they are built, will be expensive, and made available as a remote service. If a client wants to do some quantum computation on secret data, a quantum computation delegation protocol is required.
description of circuit C ϕ Client (Quantum) Server
C(ϕ)
Nothing about ϕ can be retrieved (efficiently)
Fig. 1. An illustration for computation delegation
Delegation of computation is a central problem in modern cryptography, and has been studied for a long time in classical settings. Related works include multiparty computation, fully homomorphic encryption(FHE), etc. When we delegate, there are two key aspects: privacy and authenticity. This paper will focus on privacy.
We want the delegation protocol to be useful, efficient and secure. Previous work falls into two classes: some protocols have information-theoretically security, but they either can only support a small circuit class or require huge client side quantum resources(including quantum memories, quantum gates and quantum communications); other protocols rely on classical fully homomorphic encryption(FHE). This raises the following question:
Is it possible to delegate quantum computation for a large circuit family, with small amount of quantum resources on the client side, without assuming classical FHE?
In the classical world, Yao's garbled circuit answers this question. Garbled circuit is also a fundamental tool in many other cryptographic tasks, like multiparty computation and functional encryption.
Note When designing quantum cryptographic protocols, one factor that we care about is the "quantum resources" on the client side. The "quantum resources" can be defined as the sum of the cost of the following: (1)the number of quantum memory that the client needs; (2)the size of quantum circuit that the client needs to apply; (3)the quantum communication that the client needs to make. Note that if the input(or computation, communication) is partly quantum and partly classical, we only consider the quantum part. Since the classical part is usual much easier to implement than the quantum part, as long as the classical part is polynomial, it's reasonable to say we can ignore it and only consider the complexity of quantum resources.(One exception is the communication within the protocol: if the server needs to hold a big quantum state while the classical communication in the protocol "blocks" the quantum computation on the server side, it will be a huge burden.)
Our Contributions
In this paper we develop a non-interactive(1 round) quantum computation delegation scheme for "C+P circuits", the circuits composed of Toffoli gates and diagonal gates. We prove the following:
Theorem 1. It's possible to delegate C+P circuits non-interactively in the quantum random oracle model(without assuming trapdoor one-way functions), and the client side quantum resources are O(κN q ) CNOT gates, where κ is the secret key length, N q is the number of qubits in the input. What's more, it's security can be proved when we choose κ = η + 4N q where η is the security parameter.
And we conjecture a better security proof exists when κ = η:
Conjecture 1. For the protocol mentioned above, it's secure when we choose κ = η where η is the security parameter.
We argue that our protocol is important for three reasons: (1)The client only needs small quantum resources. Here we say "small" to mean the quantum resources only depend on the key length and the input size, and is independent of the circuit size. (2) It is based on the quantum random oracle model, without assuming some trapdoor one-way function. Many protocols before, for example, [11] [14] are based on classical FHE and therefore rely on some kinds of lattice cryptographic assumptions, for example, LWE assumption. Our protocol is based on the quantum random oracle(therefore based on hash function in practice), and this provides an alternative, incomparable assumption on which we can base security of quantum delegation. (3)Our protocol introduces some new ideas and different techniques, which may be useful in the study of other problems.
Our protocol can be applied to Shor's algorithm. The hardest part of Shor's algorithm is the Toffoli part applied on quantum states, so the client can use this protocol securely with the help of a remote quantum server.
Corollary 1. It's possible to delegate Shor's algorithm within one round of communication, where the client side quantum resources are only quasi-linear quantum gates plus O(κn) CNOT gates.
Our protocol is closely related to the concept of key-dependent message(KDM) security. As a side product, we study KDM security in the quantum random oracle model. As far as we know, we are the first to study this problem. We point out that although there already exists classical KDM secure encryption scheme in the random oracle model [5] , the security in the quantum random oracle model still needs an explicit proof. We provide such a proof in this paper. Furthermore, we generalize KDM security to the quantum KDM security, and construct a protocol for it in the quantum random oracle model.
Related Work
To delegate quantum computation, people raised the concepts of blind quantum computation [7] and quantum homomorphic encryption(QHE) [8] . These two concepts are a little different but closely related: in quantum homomorphic encryption, no interaction is allowed and the circuits to be evaluated are known by the server. While in blind quantum computation, interactions are usually allowed and the circuits are usually only known by the client.
The concept of blind quantum computation was first raised in [3] . And [7] gave a universal blind quantum computation protocol, based on measurement based quantum computation(MBQC) [17] . What's more, secure assisted quantum computation based on quantum one-time pad(QOTP) technique was raised in [9] , with which we can easily apply Clifford gates securely but T gates are hard to apply and requires interactions.
Quantum homomorphic encryption is the homomorphic encryption for quantum circuits. Based on QOTP and classical FHE, [8] studied the quantum homomorphic encryption for circuits with low T gate complexity. Later [11] constructed a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme for polynomial size circuits. But it still requires some quantum computing ability on the client side to prepare the evaluation gadgets, and the size of gadgets is propotional to the number of T gates. Recently Mahadev constructed a protocol [14] , which achieves fully quantum homomorphic encryption, and what makes this protocol amazing is that the client can be purely classical, which hugely reduces the requirements on the client side.
Another viewpoint of these protocols is the computational assumptions needed. With interactions, we can do blind quantum computation for universal quantum circuits information theoretically(IT-) securely. But for non-interactive protocols, [24] gives a limit for IT-secure QHE, which implies IT-secure quantum FHE is impossible. But it's still possible to design protocols for some non-universal circuit family, [13] gives a protocol for IQP+ circuits, which contain CNOT gates and IQP gates and [23] gives a QHE based on quantum error correction code, for circuit with logarithmic number of T gates.
On the other hand, [8] [11] [14] relies on classical FHE. The current constructions of classical FHE are all based on various kinds of lattice-based cryptosystem, and the most standard assumption for lattice is the Learning-With-Error(LWE) assumption. Table 1 compares different protocols for quantum computation delegation.
Techniques
A new encoding scheme for quantum states In many previous protocols, the client hides a quantum state using "quantum one time pad": ρ → X a Z b (ρ), where a, b are two classical strings. After taking average on a, b, the encrypted state becomes a completely mixed state. We notice that this type of encoding maps one qubit in the plaintext into one qubit in the ciphertext. In our protocol, Table 1 . L is the number of gates in the circuits, Nq is the number of qubits in the input, η is the security parameter.
we introduce a new way to hide quantum states, which maps one qubit in the plaintext to κ qubits in the ciphertext:
where k 0 , k 1 are chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1} κ and distinct.
We can prove for all possible input states, if we apply this operator on each qubit, after taking average on all the possible keys, the final result will be exponentially close to a completely mixed state.
Reversible garbled circuits The second ingredient in our construction is "reversible garbled circuit". In the usual construction of Yao's garbled table, we feed the input keys into the garbled table, and get the output keys; and in the decoding phase, we use an output mapping to map the keys to the result. This well-studied classical construction does not work with quantum states. Even if the original circuit is reversible, evaluation of Yao's garbled circuit is not! To use it with quantum states, besides the original garbled table, we add another table from the output keys to the input keys. This makes the whole scheme reversible, which means we can use it on quantum state and the computation result won't be entangled with auxiliary qubits. For security, we remove the output mappings. In the context of delegation, these are kept by the client. Garbled Table  kout kin Backward Table  kout |kout Note The proof of security of this scheme is subtle. The extra information included to allow reversible execution introduces cycles in the graph of which keys are used to encrypt which others. We address by introducing key-dependent message security in the quantum model. We show that KDM-secure encryption exists in the quantum random oracle model, and use this result to prove the security of our garbled circuit construction.
Phase gate The reversible garbled circuit allows evaluating Toffoli circuits. To handle phase gates, instead of applying |k in → |k out , we can implement the following transformation:
Then we apply a "qudit Z gate" i ω i n |i i| (define ω n := e iπ/n ) on the second register, where i ∈ Z n goes through all the integers in Z n .(This operation can be done efficiently.) This will give us:
Then we apply (1) again to erase the second register. After removing the global phase the result is the same as the output of applying a phase gate R Z ( π n ) = |0 0| + ω n |1 1|.
Organisation
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some background for this paper. In Section 3 we give the entanglement encoding scheme. In Section 4 we give our construction of the quantum computation delegation protocol for C+P circuits. In Section 5 we prove the security of classical KDM secure scheme in the quantum random oracle model, as the preparation for the security proof of main protocol. Then in Section 6 we discuss the security of our protocol. Section 7.1 turns this delegation scheme to a fully blind protocol, Section 7.2 adds interaction into the protocol, and Section 7.3 shows how to use our protocol on Shor's algorithm. Section 8 generalizes KDM security to quantum settings, constructs a quantum KDM secure protocol and proves its security. Then we discuss the open questions and complete this paper. The appendix contains some omitted proofs.
Background

Basis of Quantum Computation
We give a simple introduction for quantum computing, and clarify some notations in this paper. For more detailed explanations, we refer to [15] .
In quantum computing, a pure state is described by a unit vector in a Hilbert space. A qubit, or a quantum bit, in pure state, can be described by a vector |ϕ ∈ C 2 . The symbol |· and ·| is called Dirac symbols. But a quantum system isn't necessary in pure state. When the quantum system is open, we need to consider mixed states. To describe both pure and mixed states, the state of a qubit is described by a density matrix in C 2×2 . A density matrix is a trace-one positive semidefinite complex matrix. The density matrix that corresponds to pure state |ϕ is |ϕ ϕ|, and we abbreviate it as ϕ.
For an n-qubit state, its density matrix is in C 2 n ×2 n . The space of density operators in system S is denoted as D(S).
Quantum operations on pure states can be described by a unitary transform |ϕ → U |ϕ . And the operations on mixed states can be described by superoperator ρ → E(ρ) = tr R (U (ρ ⊗ |0 0|)U † )). We use calligraphic characters like D, E to denote superoperators, and use normal font like U, D to denote unitary transforms. We will also use Sans-serif font like X, Z, Et to denote quantum operations: When they are used as Et |ϕ they mean unitary operations(used on Dirac symbol and without parenthesis), and when used as Et(ρ) they mean superoperator.
The quantum gates include X, Y, Z, CNOT, H, T, Toffoli and so on. What's more, denote R Z (θ) = |0 0| + e iθ |1 1|, where i is the imaginary unit. Denote ω n = e iπ/n , we can write R Z (kπ/n) = |0 0| + ω k n |1 1|. Since the i will be used as the symbol for indexes and "input", we avoid using i to denote the imaginary unit in this paper, and use ω n instead.
The trace distance of two quantum states is defined as ∆(ρ, σ) = 1 2 |ρ − σ| tr , where | · | tr is the trace norm.
Basis of Cryptography
A quantum symmetric key encryption scheme contains three mappings: KeyGen(1 κ ) → sk, Enc sk : D(M) → D(C), Dec sk : D(C) → D(M). [16] In this paper, the scheme needs to have a key verification procedure Ver : K × D(C) → {⊥, 1}. So a verifiable symmetric(or public) key encryption scheme contains four mappings: KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Ver.
A verifiable quantum symmetric key encryption scheme is correct if:
1. ∀ρ ∈ D(S ⊗ R), E sk←KeyGen(1 κ ) |(I ⊗ Dec sk )((I ⊗ Enc sk )(ρ)) − ρ| tr = negl(κ) 2. ∀ρ ∈ D(S ⊗ R), Pr sk←KeyGen(1 κ ) (Ver(sk, (I ⊗ Enc sk )(ρ)) =⊥) = negl(κ), and Pr sk←KeyGen(1 κ ),r←KeyGen(1 κ ) (Ver(r, (I ⊗ Enc sk )(ρ)) = 1) = negl(κ)
Here the encryption and decryption are all on system S, and R is the reference system. Sometimes we also need to encrypt the message with multiple keys. In a verifiable symmetric multi-key encryption scheme, KeyGen(1 κ ) is the same as the symmetric key scheme, Enc k1,k2,···ki encrypt the message under keys K = (k 1 , k 2 , · · · k i ), Dec k1,k2,···ki decrypts the ciphertext given all the keys k 1 , k 2 , · · · k i , and Ver(k, i, c) → {⊥, 1} verifies whether k is the ith key used in the encryption of c.
The next problem is how to define "secure" formally. The concept of indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack(IND-CPA) was introduced in [4] [12] . Let's first review the security definitions in the classical case.
Definition 1. For a symmetric key encryption scheme, consider the following game, called "IND-CPA game", between a challenger and an adversary A :
1. The challenger runs KeyGen(1 κ ) → sk and samples b ← r {0, 1}. 2. The adversary gets the following oracle, whose input space is M:
(a) The adversary chooses m ∈ M, and sends it into the oracle. The distinguishing advantage is defined by
We say a protocol is IND-CPA secure against quantum adversaries if for any BQP adversary A which can run quantum circuits as the distinguisher, there exists a negligible function negl such that Adv IN D−CP A (A , κ) = negl(κ).
Note that the "IND-CPA security against quantum adversary" characterizes the security of a protocol against an adversary who has the quantum computing ability in the distinguishing phase but can only run the protocol classically. A related concept is key dependent message(KDM) security, which was raised in [5] and developed in several papers [2] . Definition 3. The KDM-CPA game is defined similar to the IND-CPA game, except that the client is allowed to query the encryption oracle with a function f ∈ F , a message m, and an index i of the keys, and the encryption oracle returns Enc ski (f (K, m)) or Enc ski (0 |f (K,m)| ), depending on b. Note that the output of functions in F should be fixed-length, otherwise |f (K, m)| is not well-defined.
A classical KDM secure encryption scheme was constructed and proven secure in the classical random oracle model in [5] .
For quantum cryptographic scheme, we need the concept of "qIND-CPA" raised in [8] .
Definition 4. For a symmetric key encryption scheme, consider the following game, called "qIND-CPA game", between a challenger and an adversary A :
1. The challenger runs KeyGen(1 κ ) → sk and samples b ← r {0, 1}. 2. The adversary gets the following oracle, whose input space is D(M):
(a) The adversary chooses ρ ∈ D(M ⊗ R). The adversary sends system M to the oracle, and keeps R as the reference system. The distinguishing advantage is defined by
Definition 5. A protocol is qIND-CPA secure if for any BQP adversary A which can make polynomial queries to the oracle, there exists a negligible function negl such that Adv qIN D−CP A (A , κ) = negl(κ).
What's more, we call it one-shot qIND-CPA secure if the adversary is only allowed to query the encryption oracle once.
In the definition of qIND-CPA security, the adversary can query the encryption oracle with quantum state, and it can also run quantum distinguisher.
Blind Quantum Computation and Quantum Homomorphic Encryption
We compare two similar concepts in this subsection: quantum homomorphic encryption and blind quantum computation. For reference, we cite [3] [7] [8] . Some blind quantum computation protocols are interactive. For quantum homomorphic encryption, interaction is not allowed. If we focus on non-interactive protocols, the difference of quantum homomorphic encryption and blind quantum computation is which party knows the circuit: in blind quantum computation, the circuit is only known by the client but not the server; in homomorphic encryption, the circuit is known by the server but not necessarily known by the client. In our paper, we use "delegation of quantum computation" to mean in our original protocol, the circuit is known by both parties.
A non-interactive blind quantum computation protocol BQC on circuits family F = {F n } contains 4 mappings:
The key generation algorithm takes the key length κ, input length N and circuit length L and returns the secret key. BQC.Enc sk : D(M) × F → D(C). Given the encryption key and the circuit in F = ∪{F n }, this algorithm maps inputs to ciphertexts. BQC.Eval : D(C) → D(C ′ ). This algorithm maps ciphertexts to some other ciphertexts, following the instructions which may be contained in C. BQC.Dec sk : D(C ′ ) → D(M ′ ). This algorithm decrypts the ciphertext and stores the output in M Here we put N, L into the KeyGen algorithm, which are needed in our protocol. In quantum computation delegation, the definition of encryption is replaced by
, and the evaluation is replaced by Eval C .
Garbled Table
We make a simple introduction of Yao's garbled table [22] here. Garbled table is a powerful technique for the randomized encoding of functions. When constructing the garbled table of some circuit C, we pick two keys for each wire, and denote them as k w b , where b ∈ {0, 1}, and w is the index of the wire.
The garbled table is based on a verifiable symmetric key encryption scheme. For gate g, suppose its input wires are w 1 , w 2 , and the output wire is v. We construct the following table:
And we pick a random permutation in S 4 to shuffle them. If we are given the garbled table for some gate, and give a pair of input keys, we can evaluate the output keys in this way: try each row in the garbled table and see whether the given keys pass the verification. If they pass, use it to decrypt this row and get the output keys.
By providing the input keys and the garbled table for each gate in the circuit, we can evaluate the output keys for the whole circuit. And in the randomized encoding problem the client also provides the mapping from the output keys to the corresponding value on some wires: k w b → b, for some set of ws. The server will know the output values on these revealed wires, but the values on other wires are hidden. This garbled circuit construction allows an N C 0 client to delegate the evaluation of a circuit C to the server.
Quantum Random Oracle Model
A classical random oracle is an oracle which all parties can query, returns independent random value for different inputs, and returns fixed value for the same input. In practice, a random oracle is usually replaced by a hash function.
A quantum random oracle is a random oracle that allows the user to query it with quantum states. It can do the map H : |a |b → |a |H(a) ⊕ b . The quantum random oracle is studied in several papers [6] [21] . This paper focuses on the quantum cryptographic protocols in the quantum random oracle model, and does not assume any "trapdoor function". What's more, in our proof, the random oracle doesn't need to be programmable.
A New Encoding Scheme of Quantum States
Let's first introduce our new encoding scheme, Et, to "hide" the quantum state. For each qubit in the input, we pick two random different keys k 0 , k 1 ∈ {0, 1} κ and encode the input qubits with the following operator:
The dimensions of two sides are not the same, but we can add some auxiliary qubits on the left side. As long as k 0 , k 1 are distinct, this operator is unitary.
For pure quantum state |ϕ = α i1i2···iN |i 1 i 2 · · · i N , given key set K = {k n i }, where n ∈ [N ], i ∈ {0, 1}, if we apply this operator on each qubit, using keys {k n 0 , k n 1 } for nth qubit, we get:
A direct calculation shows that if the keys are long enough, chosen randomly and kept secret, this encoding is statistically secure, in other words, the mixed state after we take average on all the possible keys, is close to the completely mixed state with exponentially small distance:
Suppose we apply the Et operation on system S with key length κ, after taking average on all the valid keys, we get
Since Et is a unitary mapping, given K and Et K (ρ), we can apply the inverse of Et and get ρ:
Note that when applying Et we enlarge the space by appending auxiliary qubits, and when applying Et −1 we remove these auxiliary qubits.
Fact 1 Et can be implemented with only CNOT operations.
Proof. First implement mapping |0 → |0 κ , |1 → |k 0 ⊕ k 1 . This can be done by CNOT the input into the places where k 0 ⊕ k 1 has bit value 1. Then apply X gates on the places where k 0 has bit value 1. This will xor k 0 into these registers and complete the mapping |0 → |k 0 , |1 → |k 1 .
We can also try to add some other gadgets in the ciphertext to achieve more complicated cryptographic scheme. In the following section, we use this encoding to design a quantum computation delegation protocol.
A Quantum Computation Delegation Protocol for C+P Circuits
In this section, we use Et encoding and a new technique called "reversible garbled circuit" to design a quantum computation delegation protocol.
C+P Circuits
[19] defined "almost classical" circuits. Here we rename it to "C+P" circuits.
Definition 6 ( [19] ). C+P is the family of quantum circuits which are composed of Toffoli gates and diagonal gates.
Fact 2 Any C+P circuit can be decomposed to Toffoli gates and single qubit phase gates. Furthermore, it can be approximated by Toffoli gates and single qubit phase gates of the form R Z ( π n ) = |0 0| + ω n |1 1| , n ∈ N + , where ω n is the nth root of unity. To approximate a circuit of length L of Toffoli gates and single qubit phase gates to precision ǫ, we can only use Toffoli gates and gates
We consider D as a fixed value in this paper. Since ǫ depends exponentially on D, a small D in practice should be enough and it will at most add a logarithmic term in the complexity.
Protocol Construction
The idea comes from the Yao's Garbled Circuit construction. We have discussed the construction in section 2.4. The garbled circuit construction is commonly used for randomized encoding, but we find it can be revised for quantum computation delegation. Let's first discuss the ideas briefly. If we try to use garbled table construction on a quantum circuit, the first problem is, the classical garbled circuit is not reversible, and it's not possible to use it to implement the quantum operations. But there is a direct fix: when constructing the garbled tables, instead of just creating one table for each gate, we construct two tables, in one table we encrypt the output keys with the input keys, and in the other table we encrypt the input keys with the output keys! This will make the garbled circuit reversible, which means, the garbled circuit mapping can be applied on quantum state unitarily.
But another problem arises: If we construct a "reversible garbled circuit" in this way, it's not secure any more. But it turns out, if we remove the output mapping(which is used in randomized encoding to map the output keys to the plaintext of output), it will become secure again, under some reasonable assumptions. And that will give us a delegation protocol, which is what we want. The full protocol is specified in Protocol 1, and let's first explain it with more details.
Toffoli gates: reversible garbled table First recall that in the classical garbled circuit, the evaluation operation on each garbled gate takes the input keys as the input and computes the keys on the output wires. This mapping is classical, and there is a standard way to transform a classical circuit to a quantum circuit, by introducing auxiliary output registers, and keeping the input:
Where k in is the input keys, and k out is the corresponding output keys. We use the second register as the output register, and c is the original value in the output register. This mapping computes the output keys from the garbled table and xors them to the second register. This mapping is unitary, and we can also put entangled state on the left hand side of (6) . But the problem is, if you use it directly on a quantum state, the input and output will be entangled together. Explicitly, for a specific Toffoli gate, we use k w1 u , k w2 v , k w3 w to denote the keys of the input wires w1, w2, w3 which corresponds to the input (u, v, w); for the output part the keys are k v1 u , k v2 v , k v3 w . If we apply (6) directly, we get:
But what we need is the following mapping:
Which means, we need to disentangle and erase the input registers from the output registers.
Remember for each Toffoli gate there are eight possible combinations of input keys, and this mapping should work for all the eight combinations.
To erase the input from the output, we need two mappings: |k in |0 → |k in |k out and |k in |k out → |0 |k out . Both operations have the same form as equation (6) . (For the second step, we could view the k out as input, k in as c, and get |k out |k in ⊕ k in ) So we can use two garbled tables for this "reversible garbled table"! So instead of computing CL.Enc kin (k out ) as in the original garbled table scheme, for each gate and each input-output pair, we will compute:
where CL is some verifiable multiple key encryption scheme. And we put the CL.Enc kin (k out ) given above into a table(there are eight input-output key pairs so there are eight rows in this table), and shuffle them randomly; and we do the same thing for CL.Enc kout (k in ) above. So we get two tables for each gate. We will use the first table to apply the map |k in |0 → |k in |k out , and use the second table to compute the input from the output keys: when it's applied on |k in |k out , it "erases" the input and implements the mapping |k in |k out → |0 |k out .
For the encoding of input, recall that in the usual garble table construction, we encrypt each bit in the input with mapping:
To make it quantum, instead of replacing the classical bits with the corresponding keys, we use Et operator to hide the inputs. And we notice that (7) is a special case of Et where the input is classical! Phase gates Now we can evaluate the Toffoli gates. But what if we meet a phase gate? From Fact 2, we only need to consider the single qubit phase gates in the form of R Z ( π n ), n ∈ Z + . Suppose we want to implement such a gate on some wire, where the keys are k 0 , k 1 , corresponding to values 0 and 1, as discussed in the last subsection.
To implement R Z ( π n ), we first pick a random integer m ∈ Z n . What we are going to do is to create a table of two rows, put CL.Enc k0 (c) and CL.Enc k1 (c + 1) into the table and shuffle it. When we need to evaluate R Z ( π n ), we will first decrypt the garbled table and write the output on an auxiliary register |0 . So we can implement the following transformation:
This step is similar to implementing equation (6). Then we apply a "qudit Z gate" i ω i n |i i| on the second register, where i ∈ Z n goes through all the integers in Z n .(This operation can be done efficiently.) This will give us:
Then we apply (8) again to erase the second register. After removing the global phase the result is the same as the output of applying a phase gate R Z ( π n ) = |0 0| + ω n |1 1|.
What's more, since m is chosen randomly the garbled gate won't reveal the keys.(This fact is contained in the security proof.)
Protocol Design
Let's formalize this garbled circuit based quantum computation delegation protocol. Let's call it GBC.
We index the wires in the circuit as follows: If two wires are separated by a single qubit phase gate, we consider them as the same wire; otherwise(separated by a Toffoli gate, or disjoint), they are different wires. We suppose we have already transformed the circuit so that there is no controlled phase gate. For a circuit with N input bits and L gates, the number of wires is at most N + 3L.
Protocol 1 The protocol GBC, with CL being the underlying classical encryption scheme, for a circuit C which is composed of Toffoli gates and phase gates in the form of R Z ( π n ), is defined as:
). (Note that with the reference system, the first part is (I ⊗ Et Kin )(ρ RS ).) Evaluation GBC.Eval C (ρ q , tabs): Output EvalTAB C CL (ρ q , tab(g)) Decryption GBC.Dec K (σ): Suppose the output key in K is K out . Apply the map Et −1 Kout (·) on σ and return the result.
TAB C CL (K) and EvalTAB C CL (ρ q , tab(g)) appeared in this protocol are defined as follows:
where tab g is defined as follows: Protocol 3 EvalTAB C CL (ρ, tab): Suppose circuit C has gates (g i ) L i=1 . For each gate g in C, whose corresponding garbled gate is tab g in tab:
If g is a Toffoli gate, with input wires w1, w2, w3, output wires v1, v2, v3: Suppose tab g = (tab1, tab2), where tab1 is the table from input keys to output keys, and tab2 is from output keys to input keys. Suppose ρ ∈ D(S g ⊗ S ′ ), where S g is the system that is currently storing the keys on the input wires of g, and S ′ is the remaining systems:
1. Introduce three auxiliary registers and denote the system as S ′ g . Use tab1 to apply the following mapping on S g , as discussed in the Section 4.2: If g is a phase gate in the form of R Z (π/2 d ), applied on wire w: Suppose ρ ∈ D(S g ⊗ S ′ ), where S g is the system that is currently storing the keys on the input wires of g, and S ′ is the remaining systems:
1. Use tab g to apply the mapping |k w |0 → |k w |m , where m is the decryption output. 2. Apply i ω i n |i i| on the system of m. 3. Apply the mapping |k w |m → |k w |0 again to erase m.
The following two theorems summarize its correctness and efficiency: Theorem 2. Protocol GBC is a correct non-interactive quantum computation delegation protocol for C+P circuits.
Theorem 3. In GBC protocol, the quantum resources required on the client side are O(κN q ) CNOT gates, where κ stands for the key length used in the protocol, N q is the size of quantum states in the input, and independent of the size of the circuit.
Here we use N q instead of N because we want to consider the case where some part of the input is classical and some part of it is quantum. To make the protocol secure we may need to choose κ depending on N q . This is discussed with more details in Section 6.
This means the quantum resources of this protocol are independent of the circuit to be evaluated! In practice the circuit may be a large polynomial of the input length, and our protocol will not be affected by this.
On the Related Impossibility Results of Quantum Computation Delegation
There are several impossibility results on delegation of quantum computation, for example, [24] [1]. [24] gives us a limit on IT-secure QHE, and their result can be applied to C+P gates. That might make us think that delegation of quantum computation on C+P gates must reply on trapdoor one-way functions, but our protocol bypasses the limit in two ways: (1) making the circuit public; (2) using quantum random oracle. In practice, these conditions don't affect the usability too much; but they lead to something different, and lots of open questions arise here.(See Section 9 for further discussion.)
KDM Security of Classical Encryption against Quantum Attack
To prove the security, we need to first discuss key dependent message security(KDM security). As we can see, in GBC we encrypt the output keys with the input keys and encrypt the input keys with the output keys. That means usual security is not enough and we need at least KDM security.
KDM security was discussed in several papers, for example, [5] [2]. [5] gaves classical KDM secure encryption scheme in random oracle model, and [2] constructed KDM secure protocols in the standard model, based on some hard problems, for example, Learning-With-Error.
Let's first define a weaker form of the usual KDM security. Previous papers usually defined KDM security adaptively, which means, the adversary can make encryption queries after it receives some ciphertexts. But in our work we only need to consider the non-adaptive setting. What's more, we only need to consider the symmetric key case. To summarize, the game between the adversary and the challenger can be defined as:
The symmetric key non-adaptive KDM game naSymKDM for function family F against quantum adversary A in the quantum random oracle model with parameters (κ, L, T, q) is defined as follows.
The challenger chooses bit
2. The adversary and the challenger do the following T times, non-adaptively, which means, the challenger will only send out the answers in step (b) after it has received all the queries: 3. The adversary tries to guess b using distinguisher D and outputs b ′ . Here D is a quantum operation and can query the oracle with quantum states. Suppose D will query the random oracle for at most q times.
f can also query the random oracle, and it only makes queries in classical states. What's more, the output of functions in F should has a fixed length, otherwise |f (K, m)| will not be well-defined. The guessing advantage is defined as Adv naSymKDM Where L(κ), T (κ), q(κ) are polynomial functions that may depend on the adversary.
A KDM Secure Protocol in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
In the quantum random oracle model, we can give a construction of the classical KDM secure encryption scheme KDMP. Here "classical" means the encryption and decryption are purely classical. But the distinguisher may query the quantum random oracle in superposition.
Protocol 4
We can construct a verifiable symmetric KDM secure encryption scheme KDMP in the quantum random oracle model, where we denote the random oracle as H:
and ⊥ otherwise.
Since the execution of this protocol is classical, the correctness can be proved classically and is obvious. We refer to [5] here and write it out explicitly for convenience.
Theorem 4 (Correctness). KDMP is a correct verifiable symmetric key encryption scheme in the quantum random oracle model.
The security under classical random oracle model has been proven. But here we study the quantum random oracle, so although the protocol is almost the same, we still need to give a new proof.
Theorem 5 (Security). Define F [q ′ ] as the set of classical functions that queries the random oracle at most q ′ times. For any adversary which can query the random oracle quantumly at most q times, we have
where poly is a fixed polynomial.
We put the proof in the appendix.
Security of GBC Protocol
In this section we discuss the security of protocol GBC. First we need to construct a classical encryption scheme as its underlying scheme.
Construction of the Underlying Classical Encryption Scheme
Protocol 5 The underlying multi-key encryption scheme CL is defined as:
where H is the quantum random oracle.
Note that this is very similar to Protocol 4, except that this is multi-key and Protocol 4 is single-key. We will use it as the underlying scheme of GBC.
Security of GBC against Classical or Quantum Attack
In this subsection we give the security statements of GBC. First, we can show, when used as a classical scheme, GBC CL is secure:
Proposition 1. GBC CL is one-shot IND-CPA secure against quantum adversary in the quantum random oracle model. Explicitly, if the distinguisher that the adversary uses makes at mostueries to the quantum random oracle, the input size is N and the size of circuit C is L,
Where poly is a fixed polynomial that does not depend on A or the parameters.
The detailed proof is in the appendix. But we meet some difficulty when we try to prove the qIND-CPA security. We leave it as a conjecture: Conjecture 2. GBC CL is one-shot qIND-CPA secure in the quantum random oracle model.
But if we use a bigger key length, we can prove its security. Theorem 6. Suppose N q is the size of quantum states in the input, then GBC CL is one-shot qIND-CPA secure, in the quantum random oracle model when we take κ ≥ 4N q and consider η = κ − 4N q as the security parameter, where κ is the key length. In other words, for any BQP adversary A , there exists a negligible function negl:
Although we don't have a proof for Conjecture 2, we conjecture it is true, since this protocol seems to be a very natural generalization from classical to quantum. We leave it as an open problem. But from Theorem 6 we know when we take κ ≥ 4N q and consider κ − 4N q as the security parameter the security has been proved. So when L = ω(N 2 q ) the quantum resources for the client to run this protocol are smaller than running the circuit itself anyway.
What's more, we claim that this protocol is still secure when we replace the random oracle with practical hash functions or symmetric key encryption schemes:
Conjecture 3. When we replace the quantum random oracle in GBC CL with practical hash functions or symmetric key encryption schemes, like the SHA-3 or AES, the security statements still hold.
Security Proof
IND-CPA security of Protocol 1 The proof of Proposition 1 is postponed into supplementary materials. The proof starts from Theorem 5, which is about KDM security for general KDM function. Note that definition of IND-CPA security for protocol GBC has an important difference from the KDM game security: in GBC we are trying to say the input of Et is hidden, but KDM security is about the encrypted messages in the garbled table. So it doesn't follow from the security of KDMP protocol trivially.
Discussions of qIND-CPA To prove Theorem 6, we introduce a new security proof technique, which enables us to base the qIND-CPA advantage on the IND-CPA advantage and a classical "hard-to-compute" lemma. This technique enables us to argue about the security of a quantum protocol using only security results in the classical settings.
We need to prove the keys that are not "revealed" are "hard to compute". Then we expand the expression of qIND-CPA advantage, write it as the sum of exponential number of terms and we can find their forms are the same as the probability of "computing the unrevealed keys"! But we can prove these terms are all exponentially small, thus we get a bound for the whole expression.
Lemma 2. For any C+P circuit C, |C| = L, any adversary that uses distinguisher D which can query the quantum random oracle q times(either with classical or quantum inputs), given the reversible garbled table and input keys corresponding to one input, it's hard to compute the input keys corresponding to other input. Formally, for any i = j, |ϕ i , we have
where poly is a fixed polynomial that does not depend on A or the parameters, N is the size of inputs, and R denotes the randomness used in the computation of TAB C CL (K), including the random oracle outputs, the random paddings and the random shuffling. And TAB C CL (K, R) is the output of TAB C CL (K) using randomness R, and since R is given as a parameter there will be no randomness inside.
Note that since we have already fixed all the randomness, TAB C CL (K, R) is pure. We also note that this can be seen as a classical lemma since |i , |j are all in computational basis. We postpone the proof into supplementary materials.
Let's prove Theorem 6 from Proposition 1 and Lemma 2. We will expand the the expression of input state and qIND-CPA advantage, and we will see each term in the cross terms can be bounded by (11) .
Proof (of Theorem 6). First, suppose the state that the adversary uses is |ϕ = i c i |i |ϕ i , where i ∈ [2 Nq ] and |ϕ i is in the reference system. We can only consider pure states since we can always purify mixed states with a reference system.
Then we can assume the distinguisher D is a unitary operation D on the output and auxiliary qubits, followed by a measurement on a specific output qubit. So we can write D(ρ) = tr R (D(ρ ⊗ |0 0|)D † ), where |0 0| stands for big enough auxiliary qubits. Let's use E proj (ρ) to denote the operation of projecting ρ onto the computational basis. Denote the projection operator onto the |0 0| space as P 0 , we have
=| Pr(D(E K GBC.Enc K (ϕ)) = 1)) − Pr(D(E K GBC.Enc K (0 N )) = 1)| (13) ≤| Pr(D(E K E R (ρ)) = 1)) − Pr(D(E K E R (E proj (ρ))) = 1)|+ | Pr(D(E K GBC.Enc K (E proj (ϕ))) = 1)) − Pr(D(E K GBC.Enc K (0 N )) = 1)|
Here we write ρ := (I ⊗ Et K )(ϕ) ⊗ TAB(K, R).
Let's first compute the first term.
| Pr(D(E K E R (ρ)) = 1)) − Pr(D(E K E R (E proj (ρ))) = 1))|
Substitute it back into (26), we will know
The second term in (14) can be bounded by Proposition 1. E proj (ρ) is a classical states so we have
Combining these two inequalities we have
Standard Model
In the last section we prove the security in the quantum random oracle model. In practice, the random oracle can usually be replaced with hash functions, and we claim that our protocol is not an exception(Conjecture 3). In our protocol, it's more natural to use a symmetric key encryption scheme directly: the usage of random oracle in our protocol is on the verifiable symmetric multi-key encryption scheme, and the verification can be replaced with the "point-andpermute" technique from the classical garbled circuit. But the random oracle model enables us to prove its security easier. When using symmetric key encryption instead of the random oracle, since in our protocol we use affine functions in KDM game, we need at least that the symmetric key encryption is secure against quantum adversary under KDM game for affine functions. Although this is a strong assumption, it's still reasonable in practice.
Applications
Blind Quantum Computation for C+P Circuits
Protocol 1 is a quantum computation delegation protocol. But since the circuit can be put into inputs, we can turn it into a blind quantum computation protocol, where the server doesn't know either input state or the circuit to be applied. If we only want to hide the type of gates in the circuit, our original protocol actually already achieves it. But if we want to also hide the circuit topology, we need to do more. The adversary should only know the fact that the circuit is a C+P circuit, the input size and an upper bound on the circuit size. In this subsection we are going to construct a universal machine U such that for all the C+P circuit C, C(ρ) = U(C, ρ). What's more, we want U to be in C+P so that we can use our protocol on U.
Suppose the size of input is N and the phase gates are all in the form of R Z (π/2 d ), d ∈ [D]. Then there are N 3 + N D possible choices for each gate. Thus a log(N 3 +N D) bits description is enough for each gate. For the server-side evaluation, a bad implementation may lead to N 3 + N D extra cost, and we can do a simple preprocessing on the circuit to reduce it: We can first introduce three auxiliary wires, and convert C to a form that only contains three types of gates:
(1)R Z (π/2 d ) (2)a SWAP operation between a normal wire and an auxiliary wire (3)a Toffoli gate on the auxiliary wires. After this transformation, the number of choices of the gates is only 3N + 1 + N D. Thus we can describe each gate by a string of length log(3N + 1 + N D). And given the description of g, the operation of U is a series of multi-controlled gate operations, where the control wires correspond to the gate description and the target wires are the wires in the original circuit. And this multi-controlled multi-target operation is also in C+P and it can be transform to the standard form of Toffoli and phase gates.
Since U itself is a C+P circuit, we can delegate it by applying Protocol 1. Then the original circuit will be indistinguishable from the identity circuit, which means we know nothing beyond some information on its size.
Adding Interactions
What's more, by making it interactive we can get a blind quantum computation protocol for universal circuits. As we discussed before, our protocol can work for C+P gates, but not H gates. Every time the circuits meet an H layer, the server can send the whole state back, then the client decrypts, applies H and encrypts again, and sends it to the server and the protocol continues.
[20] contains some results on the H depth of quantum circuits, and introduced the concept of "Fourier Hierarchy"(FH). Then we get The number of interactions is linear to the H depth. This is different from several previous protocols, for example, [7] , where the number of interactions is linear to the T depth.
Usually, the security proof for an interactive protocol can be harder than a non-interactive protocol. But in this protocol, the client can get the whole computation result and re-encrypt it with fresh new keys, so its security can be based on the security of the single round protocol.
Delegation of Shor's Algorithm
Shor's algorithm contains two parts: first we apply lots of Toffoli gates on |+ ⊗n ⊗ |M , where M is, for example, the number to be factored, and n = log M ; then measure, apply quantum Fourier transform and measure again. From [10] [18] we know the quantum Fourier transform is actually easy to implement: a quantum Fourier transform on n qubits has time complexityÕ(n). The main burden of Shor's algorithm is the Toffoli part.( [18] contains resource estimates on elliptic curve.) With this protocol we can let the server do the Toffoli part of Shor's algorithm without revealing the actual value of the input.
Explicitly, suppose the client wants to run Shor's algorithm on M while wants to keep M secret, the client can use the following protocol: For comparison, if the client runs Shor's algorithm locally, the client needs to perform ω(n 2 log n) Toffoli gates, and the exact form depends on the multiplication method it uses. Schoolbook multiplication leads to O(n 3 ) complexity; if it uses fast multiplication method, the complexity is still ω(n 2 log n) and there is a hidden big constant.
8 Quantum KDM security in the quantum random oracle model, where F [poly] is the function family that makes at most poly(κ) queries to the quantum random oracle.
Open Problems
One obvious open problem in our paper is to prove Conjecture 2, the qIND-CPA security without additional requirement on κ. We believe this is true, but we can only prove the security when κ−4N q = η. And another further research direction is to base these protocols directly in the standard model, on the existence of hash functions or symmetric key encryption schemes that are exponentially KDM secure for affine functions against a quantum adversary. We can also study how to optimize this protocol, and how efficient it is compared to other protocols based on quantum one time pad. One obvious route is to make use of the optimization techniques for classical garbled circuit. Another open question is whether this protocol is useful in other problems than Shor's algorithm. Lots of previous works studied quantum circuits on {Clifford, T} gate set, and our work shows {C+P, H} is also important and worth studying. There are not many works on converting quantum circuits into layers of C+P gates and H gates, and it's possible that some famous quantum algorithms which require a lot of T gates, after converted into {C+P, H} gate set, can have small H depth. This problem is still quite open, and further research is needed here.
What's more, KDM security in quantum settings is an interesting problem. This paper gives some initial study on it, but there are still a lot of open questions. Is it possible to construct quantum KDM secure protocol in the standard model? Could quantum cryptography help us design classical KDM secure scheme?Again, further research is needed here.
This paper also gives some new ideas on constructing secure quantum encryption schemes without using trapdoor functions. Although there is some result [24] on the limit of information-theoretically secure quantum homomorphic encryption, in our work we use the quantum random oracle and make the circuits available to the client, the limit doesn't hold any more. So here comes lots of interesting problems on the possibility and impossibility of quantum computation delegation: What is the limit for non-interactive information-theoretically secure delegation of quantum computation, where the circuit is public/private, with/without quantum ROM? If we allow small amount of quantum/classical communication, does it lead to something different?
Supplementary Materials
A Missing Proofs
A.1 Missing Proofs in Section 3 to 5
Proof (of Lemma 1). Let's first consider the encryption of one qubit. Suppose the input is |φ SR = α |0 |ϕ 0 + β |1 |ϕ 1 , and we apply Et on the first register. The lemma holds since:
where |Φ = ( 1 √ 2 (|0 + |1 )) ⊗κ . The first term can be written as 1 2 κ I ⊗ tr S (φ). Which means
Using this inequality on all the encrypted qubits completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of optimality of Grover's algorithm, which can be found in [25] . But we need to make some revisions which are necessary for this problem. First, we notice that the key tags can also be seen as part of the ciphertexts, where the messages to be encrypted are 0 * . So we can prove this proposition without considering the key tags, and we need to redefine T as 2T . This won't affect the final result since 2 can be absorbed into poly function.
After getting the ciphertexts from the encryption phase, the adversary will use some distinguisher D to distinguish the state and compute b ′ . By expanding the space, we can assume the distinguisher D is a measurement of a specific output qubit after applying a unitary transform O on the ciphertexts and auxiliary qubits. O can be written as O = U q H q U q−1 · · · H 1 U 0 , where H i means ith query to the quantum random oracle.
Furthermore, suppose the secret keys generated by the key generator are K = {sk i } L i=1 , and R is the set of all the randomness in the encryption phase(including the random paddings and the random outputs from the random oracle). Let c K,R denote the ciphertexts that the adversary gets in the naSymKDM game when b = 1, and e K,R denote the ciphertexts when b = 0. Then what we need to prove can be rewritten as
Where |0 0| can be very large system. Suppose H ′ is a new random oracle, which behaves the same as H but is independently random from H on inputs that contain a prefix in K. Notice that if we can replace the random oracle queries in O with H ′ , since the challenger uses H(sk||·) for encryption, the messages will be hidden and won't be distinguished.
Define
Let's first estimate | E K (φ q − ψ q )| tr . First by dividing the randomness R into R ′ , which is the randomness of H ′ , and R K|| , which is the randomness of H(sk||·) together with the random paddings. We can see
The components of |c K,R have form (R i , H(sk||R i ) ⊕ m). We can't say the randomness in R K|| hides everything in m since the computation of m = f (K, msg) may also contains some random oracle queries. But the random oracle queries of f are all in classical states so the probability that sk||R i does not appear before can be bounded. Denote the queries to the random oracle inside the circuit of f as Q. Define bad as one of the following two events: (1) for some i, sk i ||R i ∈ Q; ≤2 Pr(bad) (52)
(50) to (51) is because when sk||R i does not appear in any other places of the random oracle query, we can take average on the randomness of H(sk||R i ) and the distribution of H(sk||R i ) ⊕ 0 will be the same as H(sk||R i ) ⊕ m.
Substitute back into (47) we will know
And we have:
Where the last step is by (48)-(53).
And when we take the expectation on K, we have
≤ (4q(qL + 4T 2 (q ′ + 2)))2 −κ (65) (64) to (65) is because the inner part is the same for different K so we can take average on P K . Similarly we have E K |ψ 0 − ψ q | tr ≤ (4q(qL + 4T 2 (q ′ + 2)))2 −κ (66) Substitute (54)(65)(66) into (46), we have
Adv naSymKDM KDMP,F [q ′ ] (A (L,T,q) , κ) ≤ 2 (4q(qL + 4T 2 (q ′ + 2)))2 −κ + 4T 2 (q ′ + 2)2 −κ
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
First, let's prove a lemma. To handle the case that there are some revealed keys in the GBC game, we introduce the following game, which we called "rG" game, which is the starting point of our proof, and whose security can be proved from Theorem 5. . Define Closure(Rev) as the minimum set that satisfies:
(1)Rev ⊆ Closure(Rev); (2)∀(S j , T j ) ∈ P , if S j ⊆ Closure(Rev), then T j ⊆ Closure(Rev). 3. The challenger sends a set of secret keys {sk rid }, rid ∈ Rev to the adversary.
And for all i ∈ [J], the challenger also sends:
CL.Enc skS i (0 |skT i ||mi| ), otherwise
Here we use sk Si as the abbrevation of the three keys used for encryption whose indexes are in S i , and use sk Ti to denote the concatenation of keys whose indexes are in T i .
4. The adversary tries to guess b with some distinguisher D, which will query the random oracle(either in classical or quantum states) q times.
The guess advantage is defined as Adv rG CL (A (N,L,J,q) , κ) = | Pr(b ′ = 1|b = 1) − Pr(b ′ = 1|b = 0)|.
We have Adv rG CL (A (N,L,J,q) , κ) = poly(q, L, J)2 −0.5κ , where poly is a polynomial that does not depend on A or the parameter.
The proof is based on Theorem 5 and is postponed to the next subsection of the appendix. Now we can prove Proposition 1 from Lemma 3.
Proof (of Proposition 1). Note that, what the adversary gets in this game is already very similar to the ciphertexts in Protocol 1 when the input is classical. So with an adversary for IND-CPA game for GBC C CL with parameter (N, L, q), κ, which will choose |i i| as input and use D as the distinguisher, we can design an adversary for rG with parameters (N, 3L, 16L, q), κ in this way: 1. A key set K = (k l b ) is sampled. Let's reindex the keys with [3L]. Choose Rev i to be the set of indexes of keys revealed in Enc K (i), where i is the input string to the IND-CPA game of GBC. 2. Choose P C and M C corresponding to circuit C. Explicitly, each element of P C corresponds to a row in garbled tables, and for each row in the form of CL.Enc k1,k2,k3 (sk), it corresponds to an index i such that S i contains the indexes of k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , and T i is the indexes of sk, m i is empty. And for each row in the form of CL.Enc k (m), S i contains the index of k, and m is m i ∈ M C , T i = ∅.
and define Shuffle as the operation that arranges these ciphertexts into the corresponding places in garbled tables and shuffles each table randomly. Explicitly, let's use Oracle rG b (P C , M C ) as the output of the rG game in the third step, taking average on all the randomness. Then we have TAB C CL (K) = E M Shuffle(Oracle rG b=1 (P C , M C )) GBC C CL .Enc K (i) = K Revi ⊗ TAB C CL (K) GBC C CL .Enc K (0 N ) = K Rev0 ⊗ TAB C CL (K)
This means if we have an adversary which can distinguish E K GBC.Enc K (i) and E K GBC.Enc K (0 N ) by some distinguisher D, we can design an adversary for rG by first choosing the corresponding P, Rev, M and get K Rev ⊗ Oracle rG b=1 (P, M ), apply Shuffle and then use D to distinguish the two cases. Explicitly, by Lemma 3, when the input is i: | Pr(D(E K (K Revi ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle rG b=0 (P C , M C )) = 1))) − Pr(D(E K (K Revi ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle rG b=1 (P C , M C )))) = 1)| (69) =Adv rG CL (A ′ (N,6L,16L,q) , κ) (70) ≤poly(q, N, L)2 −0.5κ (71)
